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Summary
Can crtrzens predict administrative
behaviour?
An inquiry into the legal rules and the decisions about attending a training
while remainins in receipt of benefit
1 Starting points
One of the fundamental principles of the constitutional state is the princi-
ple of legal security. The purpose of this principle is to bring about pre-
dictability in the relations between government and citizens on the basis
of legal rules. The principle of legal security entails certain requirements
that have to be met by legislators and by the administration: legal rules
should be clear and unambiguous, and the administration should act in
accordance with these rules. The doctrine of the constitutional state pre-
supposes that the purpose of the principle of legal security can be realized
if these requirements are met, and that citizens will thus possess clarity
about their legal rights and duties.
However, it remains doubtful to what extent the principle of legal
security is realized when legal rules are administered. Are laws always
clear, and are they administered in accordance with the rules concerned?
Even if this is the case it remains to be seen whether individual citizens
really have clarity about their legal rights and duties.
The inquiry under discussion in this book focuses on the question as
to how far the principle of legal security actually induces behaviour on the
part of the administration that can be predicted by individual citizens. Can
this behaviour be predicted on the basis of laws and regulations? Is it
possible for individual citizens to predict what decisions the administration
will take when these citizens try to validate their claims?
2 Theory
If legal security is considered as an ideal which is realized, more or less,
then this thesis can be characterized as a quest for factors which contribu-
tc to or detract tiom the realization of this ideal of legal security.
If administrative behaviour is based on laws, and thus meets the requi-
rement of lcgality, this can be a contributing factor to the realization of
the principle of legal security. However, the transition of the classical to
the social constitutional state has made it more and more difficult to meet
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of Social Affairs and Employment dating from 1988 stating requirements
a training has to meet if they are to grant permission.
Industrial Insurance Associations use fwo kinds of criteria in judging
whether or not anending a training can be permitted: the object-test and
the subject-test. The object-test is used to examine whether the training
itself meets a number of criteria. Determining the criteria regarding the
contents of the training is delegated by the WW to the Social Security
Council, an organization which supervises the execution of social security
laws. The Social Security Council laid down these criteria towards the end
of 1990, four years after the WW came into force. The subject-test helps
to judge whether a training should be considered 'necessary' for an indivi-
dual receiver ofbenefit. The criteria to be used in the subject-test can not
be found in the WW itself. Moreover, these criteria are very vague and
they are not knowable to receivers of WW-benefit.
4 Predictability of administrative behaviour as seen from the
perspective of the citizen
In order to get a picture of the actual clarity people wanting to attend a
training have about their legal rights and duties, interviews were held with
205 receivers of WW- and RWW-benefit who considered attending a trai-
ning bet'ween July 1989 and June 1991. Due to the manner of selecting
the respondents it is doubtful whether they form a representative sample.
It is therefore necessary to be careful with interpreting the results of the
inquiry.
To what extent do the legal rules about attending a training and the
execution of these rules by the administration influence the clarity recei-
vers of WW- and RWW-benefit possess about their legal rights and duties?
'Clarity about legal rights and duties' has three different aspects: the
knowledge about legal rights and duties, the speed with which executive
bodies inform receivers of benefit of their decision, and the ability to
correctly predict the decision of the administration.
There is not much difference between receivers of WW-benefit and
RWW-benefit as regards their knowledge about their rights and duties,
although receivers of WW-benefit appear to be slightly better-informed.
Next, the speed with which executive bodies inform those wanting to
attend a training of their decisions. Here, the difference between receivers
of Wril- and RWW-benefit is considerable. On average, receivers of RWW-
benefit get to know the decision of the administration much earlier than
receivers of WW-benefit. Two-third of the receivers of WW-benefit do not
know the decision of the Industrial Insurance Association at the moment
their training starts. Furthermore, it appears that the nature of the decision
Summary
is connected with the amc
mes known. It takes consi
decision (i.e. Permission
inform him of a Positive
Finally, if we considet
fit to correctlY Predict tht
receivers of RW"W-benefit
fits. Both grouPs share tl
taken by ttre administrati




Agencies regarding the er
on the abilitY to correctlY
who are informed bY th,
better able to Predict the
those who are not.
5 PredictabilitY of a
perspective of lega
How predictable are the c
of the relevant laws and
Municipal Social Service
a training does not mean
RWW-benefit meet the r'
the Department of Socia
of all types of training 1
meet one or more requir
The chance that an II
to someone receiving WI
to attend meets more ol
Industrial Insurance Ass<
types oftraining are Pen
other types of training v
in which Industrial Insurr
training for an individua
consistent. Receivers of
market do not appear to
relatively strong Positiol
Summary 347
is connected with the amount of time that expires before a decision beco-
mes known. It takes considerably longer to inform someone of a negative
decision (i.e. permission refused or training tolerated), than it takes to
inform him of a positive one (i.e. permission granted).
Finally, if we consider the ability of receivers of unemployment bene-
fit to correctly predict the decision of the administration, it appears that
receivers of RW"W-benefits are better at this than receivers of WW-bene-
fits. Both groups share their relative optimism about the decision to be
taken by the administration. This optimism may also be a part of the
explanation for the difference between those receiving WW-benefit and
those receiving RWW-benefit. The optimism of the last group is nearly
always justified, whereas the optimism of the first group is far from al-
ways justified. Information given by the District Employment Exchange
Agencies regarding the expected decision turns out to be a major influence
on the ability to correctly predict the decision of the administration. Those
who are informed by the District Employment Exchange Agencies are
better able to predict the decision to be taken by the administration than
those who are not.
5 Predictability of administrative behaviour as seen from the
perspective of legal rules
How predictable are the decisions of the administration as seen in the light
of the relevant laws and regulations? Firstly, it appears that the fact that
Municipal Social Service Departments always grant permission to attend
a training does not mean that all rypes of training attended by receivers of
RWW-benefit rneet the requirements laid down in a recommendation by
the Department of Social Security and Employment in 1988. 40 percent
of all types of training permitted by Social Service Departments do not
meet one or more requirements laid down in this recommendation.
The chance that an Industrial Insurance Association grants permission
to someone receiving WW-benefit becomes greater as the training he wants
to attend meets more of the requirements of the object-test. However,
Industrial Insurance Associations do not apply the object-test very strictly:
types of training are permitted which do not meet all requirements, while
other types of training which do, are quite often not permitted. The way
in which Industrial Insurance Associations judge the necessify of a specific
training for an individual receiver ofbenefit (the subject-test) is not very
consistent. Receivers of WW-benefit with a weak position on the labour-
market do not appear to receive permission more often than those with a
relatively strong position.
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A striking result of our inquiry is the distinction Industrial Insurance
Associations make between younger and older people: older people more
often get permission to attend a training than younger people. This distinc-
tion can partly be explained by the fact that giving permission to a
younger person is more expensive to the Industrial Insurance Association
than giving permission to an older person. For a receiver of WW-benefit
over the age of 30 the chance of getting permission is always big, irres-
pective of the financial consequences granting permission has for the
Industrial Insurance Association. For a receiver of WW-benefit below the
age of 30 on the other hand, the small chance of getting permission gets
even smaller when giving permission costs the Industrial Insurance Asso-
ciation much.
Do the District Employment Exchange Agencies and the receivers of
benefit know which factors play a part in the decision of the administra-
tion? It appears that District Employment Exchange Agencies are better
able to predict than the receivers of WIW- and RW"W-benefit whether or not
the administration allows the contents of a training to influence their deci-
sion. District Employment Exchange Agencies can predict both that Indus-
trial Insurance Associations allow the contents of a training to play a role
in their decision-taking process and that Municipal Social Service Depart-
ments do not. Receivers of RWW-benefit - incorrectly - think that the
contents of a training inÍluences the decision of the Social Service Depart-
ment, while receivers of Wr9V-benefit are - equally incorrectly - of the
opinion that the contents of the training does not play a role in the deci-
sion of the Industrial Insurance Association.
A remarkable finding is that District Employment Exchange Agencies
do not appear to be aware of the fact that age can be a determining factor
in the granting of permission to someone receiving WrJV-benefit. In con-
trast, some of these people themselves do know that age is a relevant
factor.
6 Actual behaviour of receivers of unemployment benefit
Whether a receiver of unemployment benefit is, or is not informed about
the decision to be taken by the administration hardly seems to influence
his own decision whether or not to attend a training: most receivers of
benefit interviewed in this inquiry began attending a training. The fact that
the decision of the administration was still not known could hardly ever
be found among the reasons to refrain from attending a training. Further-
more, hardly anyone stopped attending their training when they received
a negative decision in the course of their training. On the whole, not only
the majority who receive permission to attend a training started doing so,
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but also those receivers of WW-benefit whose trainine is tolerated or for-
bidden by the administration.
7 Conclusion
It is difficult to predict the decisions of the administration on the basis of
the legal rules regarding training while remaining in receipt of unemploy-
ment benefit. In addition to the obscurity of the legal rules themselves,
other causes can be mentioned as well. Thus, the Social Security Council
waited nearly four years before it laid down the criteria according to
which attending a training could be allowed. And even though there are
recommendations by the Federation of Industrial Insurance Associations
and the Department of Social Affairs and Employment about the administ-
ration of the rules concerning training, executive bodies have not com-
mitted themselves to those rules. FurtherÍnore, they hardly structure their
discretionary power by laying down rules of policy. The way in which
Industrial Insurance Associations judge the necessity for an individual
receiver of benefit to attend a training is not very consistent. Moreover,
in judging the training factors play a part which fall outside the discreti-
onary power granted to the Industrial Insurance Associations, i.e. the
costs of granting permission for the Industrial Insurance Association.
Receivers of RWW-benefit are better able to predict the decisions of
the administration than receivers of WW-benefit. The ability to predict the
decision of the administration is especially important to the receivers of
WW-benefit, especially because in most cases the decision of the Industrial
Insurance Association is announced only after the training has started. The
absence of a decision at the start of the training, the inconsistent way in
which the necessity of a training is judged by Industrial Insurance Asso-
ciations and the use of the category 'tolerate' which offers little security
are detrimental to the principle of legal securiry.
Changes in the legal rules seem to be called for. Thus, executive
bodies should confine themselves to judging only the contents of a trai-
ning. They should refrain from judging the necessity of a training. The
category 'tolerate' should no longer be applied. Finally, permission to
aftend a training should automatically be given if it takes too long for the
administration to take a decision.
However, when one looks at the importance of predictability in view
of the actual behaviour of receivers of benefit in anticipation of, or in
reaction to a decision by the administration, these claims should be slight-
ly toned down. For we have seen that someone wanting to attend a trai-
ning will nearly always carry out his intentions. Apparently, he does not
regard the obligation to conform to the decision of the administration as
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the only obligation he has to meet. By attending a training he has commit-
ted himself not only to the District Employment Exchange Agency and to
the body providing the training, but also to himself and the people in his
vicinity. The obligation imposed by the administration is seldom rhe one

























aan den Rijn: Sarns
Belderbos, R.A. en C.




Max Weber, An Iní
Bendix, R. (1974),
Higher Civil Serva
Greenwood Press (,
